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Abstract: This paper discusses atheory of modal predicate logic,
which is based on S5. This paper gives four ways to define this
theory. The first way is to define asystem which tells whether
acontext supports aformula or not. In this way we evaluate a
formula with not amodel but acontext. This theory distinguish
occasional equality from necessary equality, as is discussed with the
problem of referentially opaque context. The aim of this paper is to
observe the mathematical properties of this theory. The second way
is aderivation system of Hirbert-style, which is given by adding new
axiom schemata to the rules of S5. The third is aderivation system
of Gentzen-style, where asequent is not asequence of formulae but
atable of formulae, his system satisfies cut elimination. The fourth
is akind of possible-world semantics. In the fourth way, aformula
is valid when the formula is true in each partial abstraction models.
This paper shows the equivalence of these four ways, that is, these
four ways define the same theory.
Keywords: predicate modal logic, S5, referentially opaque context, Hirbert-
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1Introduction
There is acurious system of modal logic which appears in aliterature [T]. The
system is akind of semantical system, which tells whether acontext supports
aformula or not. we call this system asystem of logic for necessity.
Acontext is apair of formulae $\langle C, D\rangle$ which have no modal symbols and
are consistent to each other, that is, }$f$ $\neg(C\wedge D)$ in classical logic. The left
formula $C$ of the context $\langle C, D\rangle$ is called apermeant context and the right
formula $D$ is called asheltered context. We write $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ when the contest
$\langle C, D\rangle$ supports the formula $P$ . The $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}1\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\models_{\mathrm{L}}$ is defined by induction on
the construction of the formula. The precise formal definition appears in Def.
3.4. The intuitive meaning of $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ is the following. The modal operator
$\square$ shelters the sheltered context, but cannot shelter the permeant context. For
example, if $P$ is aclassical formula, then $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ iff $\vdash C\supset D\supset P$ in classical
logic, and $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}\square P$ iff $\vdash C\supset P$ in classical logic. We write $\models {}_{\mathrm{L}}P$ and call
$P$ avalid formula when $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ for each context $\langle C, D\rangle$ . Then the set of
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valid formula is regarded as atheory of modal logic. For example, $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\models_{\mathrm{L}}P\supset Q$
and $\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ , then $\models_{\mathrm{L}}Q$ (Cor. 3.13). The propositional part of $\models_{\mathrm{L}}$ is equivalent
to S5 (Cor. 4.6), although $\#\mathrm{L}$ $x=y\supset\square x=y$ .
There is some background discussion of this system from the view point of
logic in the literature [T]. But, the aim of this paper is not such adiscussion
from the logical view point. This paper aims at discussing only the mathematical
properties of this system, with comparing other three systems.
This paper introduce three other systems of modal logic. The second system
is aderivation system of Hirbert-style, which is given by adding anew axiom
schema to the rules of S5. The third is aderivation system of Gentzen-style,
where asequent is not asequence of formulae but atable of formulae. This
system satisfies cut elimination. The fourth is akind of possible-world semantics.
In the third way, aformula is valid when the formula is true in each partial
abstraction models. This paper shows the equivalence of these four ways, that
is, these four ways define the same theory.
2Language of modal predicate logic
Definition 2.1 (Language) Aset $\Sigma$ consists of finite signatures. Some of
them are predicates and the others are function symbols. Each $\sigma\in\Sigma$ has its
arity in {0, 1, 2, $\ldots$ }. Afunction symbol of arity 0is regarded as aconstant. Aset
$V$ is the set of infinitely many variables. There are four logical symbols, which
are conjunction $\wedge$ , negation $\neg$ , universal quantifier $\forall$ and modality of necessity
$\square$ .
Terms are generated in the ordinary way by the function symbols in $\Sigma$
and variables in V. For mulae are generated in the ordinary way by the terms,
predicates in $\Sigma$ , and four logical symbols.
The set $\Sigma$ has at least one predicates. The set $\Sigma$ either may have equality
$‘=$ ’as abinary predicate, or not. The sets $\Sigma$ and $V$ is ordered by alinear
ordering. This ordering is used to define the lexicographical ordering over the
terms and the formulae.
The notions of free variables, bound variables, renaming of variables, and
substitution of variables with terms are defined in the ordinary way.
Notation 2.2 If $‘=’\in\Sigma$ , then we write the equations in the usual way as t $=t’$
instead of $=(t, t’)$ .
Definition 2.3 (Classical formulae) Aformula without $\square$ is called aclas-
sical formula.
Notation 2.4 The language does not have implication, disjunction, existential
quantifier, nor possibility as primitives. We will use such logical symbols as
abbreviations.
1. $P\supset Q:\equiv\neg(P\wedge\neg Q)$
2. $P\vee Q:\equiv\neg(P\wedge Q)$
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3. $P\supset\subset Q:\equiv(P\wedge Q)\vee(\neg P\wedge\neg Q)$
4. $\exists x.P:\equiv\neg\forall x.\neg P$
5. $\mathrm{O}P$ $:\equiv\neg\square \neg P$
Notation 2.5 In this paper, the connective powers of logical symbols are listed
in the order as $\coprod,\mathrm{O}$ , $\neg,$ $\wedge,$ $\vee,$ $\supset,$ $\supset\subset,\forall$ , $\exists$ . The connective powers of $\square$ , $\mathrm{O}$ and $\neg$
are strongest and those of $\forall$ and $\exists$ are weakest. The symbols $\wedge \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ $\vee \mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}$ left
associative and the symbol $\supset \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ right associative.
Definition 2.6 (Classical logic) For aclassical formula $P$ , we write $\vdash_{\mathrm{C}}P$
if $P$ is derivable in the classical logic. Note that if $‘=’\in\Sigma$ then the rules of
equalities, namely the transitivity, are derivable in this classical logic.
3Logic for necessity
Definition 3.1 (Formula of truth) We write $\mathrm{T}$ for the formula $\neg(\neg P\wedge P)$ ,
where $P$ is the first closed classical formula in the lexicographical ordering. This
plays the role of the representative of true formulae.
Definition 3.2 (Consistency) Let $P$ and $Q$ be classical formulae, which may
be open or closed. Then the formula $P$ is consistent iff $\Psi \mathrm{c}$ $\neg P$ . The formula $P$
is consistent to $Q$ iff $\Psi \mathrm{c}$ $\neg(P\wedge Q)$ .
Definition 3.3 (Context, permeant context and sheltered context) Let
$C$ and $D$ be classical formulae which are consistent to each other. Then the pair
( $C$, $D\rangle$ is called acontext. In the context $\langle C, D\rangle$ , the left formula $C$ is called the
per meant context, and the right formula $D$ is called the sheltered context.
If the sheltered context is $\mathrm{T}$ , then we sometimes write $\langle C, -\rangle$ instead of
$\langle C, \mathrm{T}\rangle$ .
Definition 3.4 (System of logic for necessity) For aformula $P$ and acon-
text $\langle C, D\rangle$ , the relation $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ is defined in the induction on $P$ as below.
1. If $P$ has no logical symbols, then $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ iff $\vdash_{\mathrm{C}}(C\wedge D)$ :) $P$ .
2. $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P\wedge Q$ iff $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ and $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}Q$ .
3. $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}\neg P$ iff for an arbitrary classical formula $D’$ which is consistent
to $C\wedge D$ , it holds that $C$, $D\wedge D’\#{}_{\mathrm{L}} P$ .
4. $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}$ Vx.P iff $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P[t/x]$ for all the terms $t$ .
5. $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}\square P$ iff $C$, $\mathrm{T}\models {}_{\mathrm{L}}P$
We sometimes write $C,$ $-\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ for $C$, $\mathrm{T}\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ .
Definition 3.5 (Valid formula) For aformula $P$ , we write $\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ if $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}$
$P$ for each context $\langle C, D\rangle$ . we call $P$ avalid formula when $\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ .
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Remark 3.6 it is because of the rule C, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}\square P$ iff C, $\mathrm{T}\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ , that C is
called permeant and D is called sheltered.
Definition 3.7 (Weakest sheltered context) For aclassical formula $C$ and
aformula $P$ , the weakest sheltered context $\delta c(P)$ is aclassical formula defined
in the induction on $P$ as below.
1. If $P$ has no logical symbols, then $\delta c(P):\equiv C\supset P$ .
2. $\delta_{C}(P\wedge Q):\equiv\delta_{C}(P)\wedge\delta_{C}(Q)$ .
3. $\delta_{C}(\neg P):\equiv\neg(C\wedge\delta_{C}(P))$ .
4. $\delta c(\forall x.P):\equiv\forall y.\delta c(P[y/x])$ where $y$ is not afree variable in $C$ nor in $D$ .
5. $\delta c(\square P):\equiv \mathrm{T}$ iff $C\vdash \mathrm{c}\delta c(P)$ , and $\delta c(\square P):\equiv\neg C$ iff $C\psi \mathrm{c}$ $\delta c(P)$ .
Remark 3.8 All the free variable of $\delta c(P)$ are some free variables in C and P.
Remark 3.9 The formula $\delta c(P\vee Q)$ is equivalent to $\delta c(P)\vee\delta c(Q)$ . The
formula $\delta c(\mathrm{O}P)$ is equivalent to $\neg C$ if $C\vdash_{\mathrm{C}}\neg\delta c(P)$ , and $\delta c(\mathrm{O}P)$ is equivalent
to $\mathrm{T}$ if $C\Psi \mathrm{c}$ $\neg\delta c(P)$ .
Proposition 3.10 Let $C$ be classical formula and $P$ be a formula. $Then\vdash \mathrm{c}$
$\neg C\supset\delta_{C}(P)$
Proposition 3.11 Let $C$ and $P$ be classical formulae.
$\mathit{1}$ . $\vdash \mathrm{c}\delta_{C}(P)\supset\subset C\supset P$ .
2. $If\vdash \mathrm{c}C\supset P$ then $\delta c(\square P)\equiv \mathrm{T}$ , and if $\Psi \mathrm{c}$ $C\supset P$ then $\delta c(\square P)\equiv\neg C$
S. If $\Psi \mathrm{c}$ $\neg(C\wedge P)$ then $\delta c(\mathrm{O}P)$ $\equiv \mathrm{T}$ , and $if\vdash \mathrm{c}\neg(C\wedge P)$ then $\delta c(\mathrm{O}P)$ $\equiv\neg C$
Lemma 3.12 Let $P$ be $a$ for mula and $C$ and $D$ be classical fomulae. Then
$\vdash_{\mathrm{C}}D\supset\delta c(P)$ iff $either\vdash \mathrm{c}\neg(C\wedge D)$ or $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ .
Corollary 3.13 Let $P$ and $Q$ be for $rule$ and $\langle C, D\rangle$ be a context. If $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}$
$P\supset Q$ and $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ , then $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}Q$ .
Corollary 3.14 (Consistency) The set of valid formulae $of\models_{\mathrm{L}}$ is consistent.
Moreover it is a conservative extension of classical logic.
Notation 3.15 We write $F[X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}]$ for aformula which is constructed from
propositional variables Xi, $\ldots$ , $X_{n}$ with logical symbols $\neg$ , $\wedge \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ $\square$ . Let $P_{1}$ , $\ldots$ ,
$P_{n}$ be formulae. Then we write $F[P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}]$ for the formula $(F[X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}])$
$[P_{1}/X_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}/X_{n}]$ which is given by the substitution of $X_{i}’ \mathrm{s}$ with $P_{\dot{l}}$ ’s in $F[X_{1}$ ,
..., $X_{n}$ ].
Lemma 3.16 If $F[X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}]$ does not contain $\square$ , the$n\delta c(F[P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}])$ is
equivalent to $F[\delta c(P_{1}), \ldots, \delta c(P_{n})]$ in classical logic.
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Corollary 3.17 If $F[X_{1},$\ldots ,$X_{n}]$ is a classical formula which is a theorem of
classical logic, $then\models_{\mathrm{L}}F[P_{1},$\ldots ,$P_{n}]$ .
Remark 3.18 According to Cor. 3.13, Cor. 3.14, and Cor. 3.17, the set of
valid formulae is regarded as atheory of modal logic.
Remark 3.19 The fallowings hold.
$\models_{\mathrm{L}}(\forall x.\square P)\supset\square \forall x.P$ (Barcan formula)
$\models_{\mathrm{L}}(\forall x.\mathrm{O}P)\supset OVz.P$
$\models_{\mathrm{L}}(\exists x.P\wedge \mathrm{O}3\mathrm{x}.\mathrm{Q})$ :) $\exists x.P\wedge \mathrm{O}Q$ , if $P$ is aclassical formula.
$\#\mathrm{L}$ $x=y\supset\square x=y$
Remark 3.20 There has been a lot of discussion over the failure of $x=y\supset$
$\square x=y$ , which appears in the problem of referentially opaque context ([Q], and
also Sec. 2, Chap. 4in [N] $)$ . We do not discuss such problems in this paper.
4Propositional part of S5
Definition 4.1 (S5) The derivation system S5 is defined as the following rules:
Axiom:
$\overline{P}$
, where P is one of the following:
$\bullet$ Classical theorem: $F[P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}]$ , where $F[X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}]$ is atheorem of
classical logic.
\bullet Instantiation: $(\forall x.P)\supset P[t/x]$
$\bullet$ Universality sift: $(\forall x.P\supset Q)\supset P\supset Vx.Q$ , where $x$ is not free in $P$ .
$\bullet$ Equality: $x=y\supset P$ :) $P[y/x]$ , where $P$ is aclassical formula, if the
language has the symbol $‘=’$ .
$\bullet \mathrm{K}:\square (P\mathrm{C})$ $Q)\supset\square P\supset\square (;)$
$\bullet \mathrm{T}:\square P\supset P$
$\bullet$
$\mathrm{D}$ :OT
$\bullet$ 5: $\mathrm{O}\square P\mathrm{C}$) $\square P$
Implication elimination: $\frac{P\supset QP}{Q}$
Universality introduction: $\frac{P}{\forall x.P}$
Necessity introduction: $\frac{P}{\square P}$
We write $\vdash_{\mathrm{S}5}$ P if P is atheorem of S5
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Remark 4.2 The formula x $=y\supset\square x=y$ is not atheorem in the system
S5 defined here, although the system S5 is sometimes defined such as x $=y\supset$
$\square x=y$ is its theorem.
Definition 4.3 (Propositional Formula) Apropositional formula is afor-
mula without the symbols $\forall$ and $=$ .
Definition 4.4 $(\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P})$ The derivation system $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}$ , which is the propositional
part of S5, is defined as S5 with the restriction such that all of the formulae in
the proof are propositional formula. Thus, none of the rules of equality, instan-
tiation, universality sift, nor universality introduction appears in the proofs. We
write $\vdash_{\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}}P$ if $P$ is atheorem of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}$.
Lemma 4.5 For each formula $P,$ $If\vdash \mathrm{S}5P$ , $then\models\iota P$ .
Corollary 4.6 (Global Soundness of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}$) For each propositional formula
$P$ , $If\vdash_{\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}}P$ , $then\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ .
Corollary 4.7 (Casewise soundness of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}$) Let $P$ be a propositional for-
mula. Let $C$ and $D$ be classical propositional fomulae which are consistent to
each other. If there are some classical propositional formulae $E_{1}$ , E2, $\ldots$ , $E_{n}$ such
that each $E_{i}$ is consistent to $C$ and $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{p}\square C\supset D\supset \mathrm{O}E_{1}\supset\cdots \mathrm{O}E_{n}\supset P$, then
$C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ .
Lemma 4.8 (Normalisation of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}$ ) Let $P$ be a propositional forrm$ula$ . Then
there are classical propositional form ulae
$C_{1}$ , $D_{1}$ , $E_{11}$ , $\ldots$ , $E_{1m_{1}}$ ,
$C_{2}$ , $D_{2}$ , $E_{21}$ , $\ldots$ , $E_{2m_{2}}$ ,
$C_{n}$ , $D_{n}$ , $E_{n1}$ , $\ldots$ , $E_{nm_{n}}$
such that $S\mathit{5}P$ derives
$P\supset\subset \mathrm{O}C_{i}\vee D_{i}\vee\coprod E_{ij}i=\hat{1,}..,nj=1,$
$..,m$ :
As the duality, there also exists a disjunctive-conjunctive normal form.
Lemma 4.9 (Casewise completeness of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}$) Let $P$ be a propositional for-
mula. Let $C$ and $D$ be classical propositional formulae which are consistent to
each other. If $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ , then there are some classical propositional formulae
$E_{1}$ , E2, $\ldots$ , $E_{n}$ such that each $E_{i}$ is consistent to $C$ $and\vdash \mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}\square C\supset D\supset \mathrm{O}E_{1}\supset$
. . . $\mathrm{O}E_{n}\supset P$ ,
Lemma 4.10 (Global completeness of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}$) Let $P$ be a propositional for-
mula. $If\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ , $then\vdash \mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}P$ .
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5Distributive modality
Definition 5.1 $(\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D})$ The derivation system of distributive modality of $S\mathit{5}$ is
defined by adding the following axiom schema to the system S5.
$\bullet$ Distributivity:
$(\square \exists x.C)\wedge(\exists x.D)\wedge(\mathrm{O}\exists x.E_{1})\wedge\ldots\wedge(\mathrm{O}\exists x.E_{n})$
$\supset\exists x$ . $\square (C\vee D\vee E_{1}\vee\ldots\vee E_{n})\wedge D\wedge \mathrm{O}E_{1}\wedge\ldots\wedge \mathrm{O}E_{n}$
where all of $C$ , $D$ , $E_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $E_{n}$ are classical formulae.
We call this system $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}$ . We $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\vdash \mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}P$ when $P$ is derivable in this system.
Remark 5.2 The axiom of distributivity is equivalent to alittle more compli-
ea ch form:
$((\square \exists x.C\vee D\vee E_{i})\wedge\exists x.D\wedge \mathrm{O}\exists x.E_{i})i\hat{i}\supset\exists x.\square (C\vee D\vee \mathrm{v}_{i}E_{i})\wedge D$A
$\hat{i}\exists x.\mathrm{O}E_{i}$
The inverse direction of this form
$(\exists x.\square (C\vee D\vee E_{i})\wedge D\wedge\exists x.\mathrm{O}E_{i})i\hat{i}\supset(\square \exists x.C\vee D\vee \mathrm{v}_{i}E_{i})\wedge\exists x.D\wedge$
$\hat{i}\mathrm{O}\exists x.E_{i}$
is already atheorem of S5.
Lemma 5.3 (Normalisation of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}$) Let $P$ be an arbitrary formula. Then
there are classical formulae
$C_{1},D_{1}$ , $E_{11}$ , $\ldots$ , $E_{1m_{1}}$ ,
$C_{2},D_{2}$ , $E_{21}$ , $\ldots$ , $E_{2m_{2}}$ ,
$C_{n},D_{n}$ , $E_{n1}$ , $\ldots$ , $E_{nm_{n}}$
such that $S\mathit{5}D$ derives
$P \supset\subset\bigwedge_{i=1,..,n}\mathrm{O}C_{i}\vee D_{i}\vee\square E_{ij}j=1,$
$\ldots,m$ :
As the duality, there also exists a disjunctive-conjunctive normal form.
Remark 5.4 Let $P$ be atheorem of S5. We make aformula $P’$ by erasing
all the occurrences of $\square$ in $P$ . Then $P’$ is atheorem of classical logic. It
does not hold for $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}$ . For example, let $A$ and $B$ be classical formulae. Then
$(\exists x.\mathrm{O}A)\wedge(\exists x.\mathrm{O}B)\supset 3x.OA$ $\wedge \mathrm{O}B$ is atheorem of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}$ , although, of course,
$(\exists x.A)\wedge$ ( $(3x.B)$ $\supset\exists x.A\wedge B$ is not atheorem of classical logic.




Corollary 5.6 The system $S\mathit{5}D$ is consistent. Especially, $\psi \mathrm{s}5\mathrm{p}\forall xy.x=y$ .
Corollary 5.7 $S\mathit{5}D$ is a conservative extension of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}$
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Corollary 5.8 (Casewise soundness of S5D) Let P be a formula and \langle C, D\rangle
be a context. If there are some classical formulae $E_{1}$ , E2, \ldots , $E_{n}$ such that each $E_{i}$
is consistent to C and hS5D $\square C:$) D $\supset \mathrm{O}E_{1}\supset\cdots \mathrm{O}E_{n}\supset P$, then C, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ .
Theorem 5.9 (Casewise completeness of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}$ ) Let $P$ be a formula and
$\langle C, D\rangle$ be a context. If $C$, $D\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ , then there are some classical formulae
$E_{1}$ , E2, $\ldots$ , $E_{n}$ such that each $E_{i}$ is consistent to $C$ $and\vdash \mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}\square C\supset D\supset \mathrm{O}E_{1}\supset$
. . . $\mathrm{O}E_{n}\supset P$ .
Theorem 5.10 (Global completeness of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}$ ) For each formula $P$ , $if\models_{\mathrm{L}}$
$P$ $then\vdash \mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}P$ .
Remark 5.11 The system $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}$ satisfies the substitution on formulae, which is
the following property. Let $P$, $Q$ be formulae and $p$ be apredicate of arity 0.
The formula $P[Q/p]$ is made by substitution of $p$ with $Q$ in $P$ . If $\vdash_{\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}}P$ then
$\vdash_{\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}}P[Q/p]$ .
The theory of classical predicate logic also satisfies the substitution on pred-
icates, which is the following property. Let $P$, $R[x_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $x_{n}$ be aformulae and $p$
be apredicate of arity $n$ . The formula $P[R/p]$ is made by substitution of each
occurrence of $p(t_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $t_{n}$ with $R[t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}]$ in $P$ . If $\vdash {}_{\mathrm{C}}P$ then $\vdash {}_{\mathrm{C}}P[R/p]$ .
However, the systems S5 and $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}$ do not satisfies the substitution on pred-
icates. That is because the axioms of equation and distributivity are sensitive
of modality.
6Gentzen-style derivation system
Remark 6.1 Hereafter, we require the language $\Sigma$ to have equation $‘=’$ .
Definition 6.2 (Sequent) Asequent is atable formed of sequences of formulae
as below.
where each of $A_{ij}$ and $B_{ij}$ is aformula, and each $E_{i}$ is an equation such as
$t=t’$ .
Some of sequences “Ai $\mathrm{j}$ $\ldots$ , $A_{il:}$ ”, “$B_{i1}$ , $\ldots$ , $B_{im:}$ ”, and “$E_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $E_{l_{n+1}}$ ” may be
empty. The number $n$ , which is the number of the rows of the middle part, may
be 0. In such case, the middle part would be empty, such as
Notation 6.3 Let $\Gamma$ be asequence of formulae such as “$A_{1}$ , \ldots , $A_{n}"$ . We write
$\neg\Gamma$ for the sequence “ $\neg A_{1}$ , \ldots , $\neg A_{n}"$ . We write $\wedge\Gamma$ for the formulae “$A_{1}\wedge\ldots\wedge$
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$A_{n}"$ , and $\vee\Gamma$ for the formulae “$A_{1}\vee\ldots\vee A_{n}"$ , If $\Gamma$ is empty, then $\wedge\Gamma$ stands
for T and $\vee\Gamma$ stands for $\neg \mathrm{T}$ .
Definition 6.4 (Interpretation) Let $\Gamma_{0}$ , $\ldots$ , $\Gamma_{n}$ , $\Delta_{0}$ , $\ldots$ , $\Delta_{n}$ be sequences of for-
mulae, and $E$ be asequence of equations. Let $S$ be asequent such as
$S$






Remark 6.5 The intuitive meaning of $[S]$ is the following. If [$S\mathrm{J}$ does not
hold, then:
1. $(\wedge\Gamma_{0})\wedge(\wedge\neg\Delta_{0})$ must hold.
2. $(\mathrm{A}\mathrm{F}\mathrm{i})\wedge(\wedge\neg\Delta:)$ may hold for each $i=1$ , $\ldots$ , $n$ .
3. $\wedge E$ must hold if none of $(\wedge\Gamma_{\dot{l}})\wedge(\wedge\neg\Delta_{i})$ for $i=1$ , $\ldots$ , $n$ holds.
Definition 6.6 (Deduction rules) Unfortunately we cannot put the whole
rules in the main sections because of the limit of pages. The whole rules appear
in the appendix. The important rules are the rules on modality and variable
elimination. The left rules of modality are:
130
131
and the right rules of modality are:
The rule of variable elimination is:
where the variable $x$ does not appear freely in the other part.
Remark 6.7 The rules of modalities realise the modality of S5. The rule of
equation makes the axiom of distributivity sound.
Definition 6.8 (Theorem of the Gentzen-style system) For aformula P,





1. Amodel is $M=(W, X)$ , which is apair of aset of worlds $W$ and aset of
concepts $X$ .
2. Aworld is $w=$ $(D_{w}, I_{w})\in W$ , that is, aworld $w$ consists of aset of
individuals $D_{w}$ and an interpretation $I_{w}$ for the language $\Sigma$ .
3. The set $D_{w}$ , called an individual domain, is not empty.
4. For each predicate $p\in\Sigma$ of arity $n$ , the interpretation $I_{w}$ maps $p$ into a
subset $I_{w}(p)\subset D_{w}^{n}$ . If $‘=’\in\Sigma$ , then the equality $‘=$ ’ is always mapped into the
diagonal set, that is, $I_{w}(‘=’)$ $=\{\langle d, d\rangle|d\in D_{w}\}$ .
5. For each function symbol $f\in\Sigma$ of arity $n$ , the interpretation $I_{w}$ maps $f$ into
afunction $I_{w}(f)$ : $D_{w}^{n}arrow D_{w}$ . Each function symbol $f\in\Sigma$ of arity $n$ has an
action $\overline{f}$ over $\prod_{w\in W}D_{w}$ such as:
For $\xi_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $\xi_{n}\in\prod_{w\in W}D_{w},\overline{f}(\xi_{1}, \ldots, \xi_{n})(w)=I_{w}(f)(\xi_{1}(w), \ldots, \xi_{n}(w))$ .
6. $X \subset\prod_{w\in W}D_{w}$ and $X$ is closed under $\overline{f}$ for each function symbol $f\in\Sigma$ , that
is, if $\xi_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $\xi_{n}\in X$ and $f$ is afunction symbol of arity $n$ , then $\overline{f}(\xi_{1}, \ldots, \xi_{n})\in X$ .
Definition 7.2 (Environment) An environment is amap of variables $V$ into
concepts $X$ . For an environment $\rho$ , avariable $x\in V$ and aconcept $\xi\in X$ , we
write $\rho[\xi/x]$ for another environment such as:
$-\rho[\xi/x](y)=\xi$ if $y$ is $x$ .
$-\rho[\xi/x](y)=\rho(y)$ if $y$ is avariable other than $x$ .
Remark 7.3 An environment of this definition maps avariable not into an
individual but into afunction of worlds into individuals. Hughes and Cless-
well discuss such kind of environment for variables (Sec. 4, Chap 11 in [HC]).
However, they do not give the axiomatisation nor the precise characterisation.
Definition 7.4 (Interpretation of terms) For an interpretation $I_{w}$ and an
environment $\rho$ , the interpretation of terms is defined by induction on the terms
as follows:
1. $I_{w\rho}(x)=\rho(x)(w)$ for $x\in V$
2. $I_{w\rho}(f(t_{1}, t_{2}, \ldots, t_{n}))=I_{w}(f)(I_{w\rho}(t_{1}), I_{w\rho}(t_{2})$, $\ldots$ , $I_{w\rho}(t_{n}))$
Definition 7.5 (Interpretation of formulae) For amodel $M=(W, X)$ , a
world $w=(D_{w}, I_{w})\in W$ and an environment $\rho:Varrow X$ , the interpretation of
formulae is defined by induction on the formulae as follows:
1. For an atomic formula $p(t_{1}, t_{2}, \ldots, t_{n})$ ,
$(M, w,\rho)\models p(t_{1}, t_{2}, \ldots, t_{n})$ iff $\langle I_{w\rho}(t_{1}), \ldots, I_{w\rho}(t_{n})\rangle\in I_{w}(p)$
2. $(M, w, \rho)\models P\wedge Q$ iff $(M, w, \rho)\models P$ and $(M, w, \rho)\models Q$
3. (Af, $w$ , $\rho$) $\models\neg P$ iff $(M, w, \rho)\#$ $P$
4. $(M, w,\rho)\models Vx.P$ iff for all $\xi\in X$ , $(M, w,\rho[\xi/x])\models P$
5. (A#, $w,\rho$) $\models\square P$ iff for all $v\in W$ , $(M, v, \rho)\models P$
We write $M\models P$ if $(M, w, \rho)\models P$ for all $w\in W$ and $\rho$ : $Varrow X$ .
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Definition 7.6 (Total abstraction model) Amodel $M=(W, X)$ is atotal
abstraction model if the followings hold:
1. For each $w\in W$ , there are infinitely many worlds $v\in W$ which are
isomorphic to $w$ .
2. $X= \prod_{w\in W}D_{w}$
Aformula $P$ is valid for total abstraction iff $M\models P$ for all the total abstraction
models $M$ , and we $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\models_{\mathrm{T}}P$.
Definition 7.7 (Partial abstraction model) Amodel $M=(W, X)$ is a
partial abstraction model if the followings hold:
1. For each $w\in W$ , there are infinitely many worlds $v\in W$ which are
isomorphic to $w$ .
2. $M\models(\square \exists x.P)$ $\supset\exists x.\square P$ for each classical formula $P$ . In other words, for
each classical formula $P$ and each environment $\rho$ , if it holds $(D_{w}, I_{w}, \rho)\models$
$\exists x.P$ for each world $w\in W$ , then there is aconcept $\xi\in X$ such that
$(D_{w}, I_{w}, \rho[\xi/x])\models P$
. for each world $w\in W$ .
3. For each concept 4, each world $w\in W$ and each individual $e\in D_{w}$ , there
is aconcept $\xi’\in X$ such that
$-\xi’(w)=e$
$-\xi’(v)=\xi(v)$ for $v\neq w$
Aformula $P$ is valid for partial abstraction iff $M\models P$ for all the partial ab-
straction models M. and we write $\models_{\mathrm{P}}P$ .
Remark 7.8 Let $M=(W, X)$ be atotal abstraction model. If aworld $w\in W$
of $M$ has at least two individuals in $D_{w}$ , then the set of concepts $X$ cannot
be countably many. That is because there are at least countably many worlds
$v’ \mathrm{s}$ which are isomorphic to 11. Thus each of $D_{v}$ ’s has at least two individuals.
Therefore $X$ must be an uncountable set.
On the other hand, apartial abstraction model can be acountable model
even if some worlds of it have plural elements.
Conjecture 7.9 For each formula P, $\models_{\mathrm{T}}$ P iff $\models \mathrm{p}$ P.
Theorem 7.10 (Soundness of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}$ for the models) $If\vdash_{\mathrm{G}}P$ $then\models {}_{\mathrm{T}}P$,
$thus\models_{\mathrm{P}}P$ .
Theorem 7.11 (Completeness of $\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{D}$ for partial abstraction models)
$If\models_{\mathrm{P}}P$ then $P$ has a cut-free proof $of\vdash \mathrm{G}$ .
Proof. By standard tableau method. 1
Corollary $7.12\models_{\mathrm{L}}P$ $iff\models_{\mathrm{P}}P$
Corollary $7.13\vdash_{\mathrm{G}}$ satisfies cut elimination
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8Conclusion
We have defined four systems of modal $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\models_{\mathrm{L}},$ $\vdash_{\mathrm{S}5\mathrm{P}},$ $\vdash_{\mathrm{G}}$ and $\models_{\mathrm{P}}$ , and shown
that all the systems are equivalent to each other. As the consequence, the
Gentzen-style system $\vdash_{\mathrm{G}}$ satisfies cut elimination. The system $\models_{\mathrm{L}}$ is aseman-
tical system defined in apurely syntactical way. On the other hand, the system
$\models_{\mathrm{P}}$ is asemantical system defined by a variant of traditional possible-world se-
mantics. These two systems present a striking contrast to each other, although
they are equivalent to each other.
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Appendix
First of all we define the inequality which appears in structural rule.











any scopes of $\square$ .
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Variable elimination: Cut:
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